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Abstract
Ideology has been traditionally considered to be an explanation 
of political behavior, both inside and outside academia, which has 
been nowadays mostly abandoned. This paper sets out to inves-
tigate if a relationship between ideology and unconventional po-
litical participation exists, for the Costa Rican elections of 2014. It 
yields results that indicate that while the majority of Costa Ricans 
do not engage in political participation, there is a minority that 
does, with an identifiable emancipatory, statist and leftist ideolo-
gy. A strong contradiction is found in the population between their 
ideological self-identification and their values and attitudes. The 
paper then argues in favor of more nuanced measurements of ide-
ology than self-identification questions. Furthermore, it becomes 
apparent that each form of participation has a different relation-
ship with the ideological elements.Therefore, studying them as if 
they were one should be avoided. 
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values, political attitudes 
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I. Introduction
Since the word “ideology” was introduced in the social sci-
ences, the concept has been understood as a force driv-
ing the actions of individuals. Intuitively we have come to 
expect political actions to be in accordance with people’s 
stated beliefs. Even more, the type of participation will be 
based on the ideology that individuals adhere to: The left 
demonstrates on the streets, whereas the right would en-
gage through legal action, for example. These are common 
conceptions from everyday life that however could or could 
not be true, and as they are so commonplace, it would be 
interesting to corroborate if indeed they are correct.
Ideology, however, has been progressively abandoned in 
political science as an explanation for behavior, being re-
placed nowadays by either rational choice models or by the 
standard socioeconomic status model.This paper in no way 
argues in favor of abandoning either of those models, as po-
litical participation is clearly a phenomenon with a plethora 
of causes; but rather because of this, other plausible explan-
atory models should be investigated, and, amongst them, 
those that consider ideology an important variable. 
As the relationship between ideology and conventional 
types of participation has become somewhat neglected, the 
case has been even more so for other forms of political par-
ticipation. This could be due to the relatively recent interest 
in these unconventional forms of participation. 
Therefore, this paper sets out to investigate if there is 
indeed a relationship between ideologies, which interpel-
late and organize political attitudes and values, and uncon-
ventional political participation. It does so for the case of 
Costa Rica during the presidential election of 2014, using 
the Cuarta Encuesta de Cultura Política y Comportamien-
to Electoral (Fourth Survey of Political Culture and Electoral 
Behavior), and particularly taking advantage of a new set of 
ideological questions in it, which allows for a more detailed 
approach to the subject, coupled with a multivariate analy-
sis that goes beyond simple descriptive statistics.
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One of the key ironies with regards to ideology is the 
constant declarations of its demise coming from both the left 
and the right (an ideological classification itself), while at 
the same time the world experiences a revival of ideological 
movements: Islamic fundamentalism, anti-imperialist-revo-
lutionary nationalism, neo-authoritarianism in formerly-suc-
cessful examples of democratization in Eastern Europe, po-
litical neopentecostal evangelism (Eagleton, 1997: 13), and 
now we can add to these the growth of radical or alt-right 
groups in the United States, Europe and beyond. 
II. Ideology and political participation
Left, right and beyond: Ideology, values and  
political attitudes
On everyday parlance, ideology is widely understood to 
mean a strict and biased understanding of reality. Classi-
cal American sociology developed a definition that fits in-
to this outlook and emphasized the lack of flexibility as its 
main characteristic. Edward Shills defined it as, for exam-
ple: “explicit formations, closed and resistant to innova-
tion” (Eagleton, 1997: 22, translated by the author). Similar 
definitions can be found in the works of Daniel Bell, Ray-
mond Aron and the political scientist Robert E. Lane (Ea-
gleton, 1997). 
Campbell, McClosky and others introduced the topic to 
political science in the sixties, when it became common in 
the field to speak of political beliefs as integrated and co-
herent groups, focused on how to distribute resources on 
societies (Alcántara, 2004; Kuklinski and Peyton, 2007), 
“Political ideology serves as the glue that constrains and 
integrates political belief systems” (Kuklinski and Pey-
ton, 2007: 46). There is an idea that ideology interpellates 
the individual, as questions designed to measure ideology 
“tap people’s predispositions to accept or resist the politi-
cal communications they receive from their environment” 
(Kuklinski and Peyton, 2007: 59). 
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A problem with this definition quickly arose as research-
ers started to notice the lack of coherence in attitudes and 
values. Converse recognizes their existence, but as “idio-
syncratic constructions” (Converse, 2007: 149), whereas 
Lane (1962) and Semetko (2007) identify changes in po-
litical attitudes as random and without coherence or logic, 
thus political scientists started to speak of the population 
not having ideology. 
Perhaps it is possible to move away from this predica-
ment by incorporating other traditions that have further 
developed the concept of ideology. Critical theorists, neo-
marxists and the sociology of knowledge arrive at a com-
mon understanding of ideologies as “webs of significance”, 
composed of arrays of images, symbols, opinions, attitudes 
and values that relate to each other; they are a system, but 
that does not imply perfect coherence. (Adorno et al., 1950: 
2; Sartori, 1969: 400; Laclau, 1986; Laclau and Mouffe, 
1987; Eagleton, 2003: 119, 224). 
The way that ideologies work is by interpellating indi-
viduals based on their values and attitudes, themselves or-
ganized by the ideologies, functioning as a cognitive short-
cut (Sartori, 1969; Van Dijk, 1998; Kuklinski and Peyton, 
2007: 46). Values and attitudes both seek to influence hu-
man behavior, as they exist only in the mind of the individ-
uals, there is no way to measure them directly. Therefore, it 
is important to infer them by the way people evaluate activ-
ities and situations (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart and 
Klingemann, 1979; Van Dijk, 1998; Halman, 2007). 
Figure 1 represents the relationship between attitudes, 
values, ideology and participation. Values are the base of 
attitudes, both are contained and organized by ideologies, 
and as such the three pull the individual towards partici-
pation, as ideologies are visual images that represent “gen-
eralized social and political values that individuals may 
wish to see realized in a given political system (Fuchs and 
Klingemann ,1990: 213 in Opp et al., 1995: 66).
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Figure 1.  
Relationship between values, attitudes, ideology  
and political participation
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This more nuanced understanding of ideology also illumi-
nates a pressing measurement problem. In almost all po-
litical behavior research, ideology is measured asking a 
self-identification question. The problems with this are nu-
merous: most individuals have no political knowledge to 
properly identify themselves according to their values, at-
titudes and policy preferences;3 there is also the danger 
that they will identify superficially with an ideology but be 
guided in their policy preferences by a completely different 
set of values and attitudes.4 Using a single left-right scale 
also presents a problem when individuals have a complete-
ly different understanding of what those poles mean.5 Fi-
3 As it would be demonstrated later in this paper, most Costa Ricans self-iden-
tify as center or right-wing, but in fact they present a strong preference for 
Government intervention in the economy and what might be called “conser-
vatism”. An even more extreme case can be found in Opp et al. (1995), in it, 
representative samples of the population in West Germany, Israel and Perú 
were asked to self-identify in the left-right scale. Around 15 % of each sam-
ple had to be dropped from the study, as they declared that they did not know 
what “left” and “right” meant. 
4 For clarification purposes, think of a middle-class Marxist academic that con-
stantly quotes Das Kapital, yet always votes for a conservative party.
5 This could happen, for example, if a researcher wants to use the scale to measure 
ideology on social, progressiveness vs. conservatism terms, but the respondent 
thinks of left and right as economic poles. If the respondent is a libertarian, he 
would rank himself as a right-winger, but in reality, he should be ranked as a 
left-winger. 
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nally, lack of honesty from the respondent while identifying 
with a controversial ideology is another problem.6 
Ideology has been traditionally classified as a left-right 
scale, which is of an economic nature, in which left means 
more government intervention and right less (Castles and 
Mair, 1984; Bobbio, 1996). This classification has, how-
ever, been heavily criticized for not considering other di-
mensions, and complementary ones have been proposed 
by Bobbio (1996), Kitschelt (Mair, 2007) and Nolan (Meek, 
1999) amongst others, mostly focusing on individual free-
dom and self-government on social issues. 
Inglehart’s big contribution to political science is the in-
troduction of a postmaterialist values dimension. In this di-
mension, people move between two scales, a traditional-
secular one, and a survival-self-expression one.This pole of 
individual self-expression and self-actualization is concep-
tually very similar to the previously presented idea of self-
government on social issues. 
A very strong correlation has been found between these 
two scales and others like the ones proposed by Schwartz, 
Hofstede and Triandis, Adorno, Rokeach, Lasswell, Eysenck 
and Brittain, suggesting that they all measure the same un-
derlying concepts (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; 
Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Meek, 1999; Inglehart and Oy-
serman, 2004; Schwartz, 2006; Sibley et al., 2006; Welzel, 
2007).
Summing up, there seems to be two dimensions of po-
litical values and attitudes, a material or economic one, and 
a postmaterialist or social one. The first one corresponds to 
the traditional left-right scale, but would more accurately be 
called a statism-economic liberalism scale. The second scale 
would move between an emancipatory pole which empha-
sizes the individual and its self-expression, and a collectivist 
pole focused on the survival and cohesion of the group.
6 Attempts to find people that self-identify for a survey as followers of Nazism, 
fascism or anarchism would more than likely be a fruitless endeavor.
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Unconventional political participation
These previously introduced concepts: ideology, attitudes 
and values –regardless of the dimensions in which they are 
located– seek to influence the voluntary actions of the citi-
zenry that are directed themselves at influencing political 
decisions. That is the definition of political participation, a 
concept originally limited to electoral participation and ac-
tivities related to elections (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berel-
sonet et al., 1954; Lane, 1959; Verba and Nie, 1972; Van 
Deth, 2001).
In the sixties, the concept started to expand, by includ-
ing petitioning to politicians and other forms of direct con-
tact, as well as more controversial forms of participation 
such as protests and new social movements. At first there 
was some controversy on the field over whether these 
could be considered forms of political participation, but, 
as Van Death puts it: “protest and rejection are clear ex-
pressions of the interests and opinions of the citizens and 
should not be excluded from the field of political participa-
tion” (Van Deth, 2001: 6). Not only that, but as these are ac-
tions that clearly seek to influence policy, they fit with all 
the criteria to be considered political participation. 
One of the proposed classifications for the different types 
of political participation is according to how soon political 
science accepted them as valid forms (Barnes and Kaase, 
1979). Conventional participation is the one connected to 
voting and electoral participation in general, or directly 
contacting politicians, in which citizens try to directly influ-
ence policy between the boundaries of the political system. 
All the other types would be unconventional, as their influ-
ence is indirect and have only recently begun being con-
sidered participation (Van Deth, 2001; Marien et al., 2010).
A more theoretical way of looking at the distinction is by 
the contrast between “conventional and elite supporting” 
versus “unconventional and elite challenging” participation. 
Conventional includes electoral participation as well as com-
munity involvement, whereas the unconventional repertoire 
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of participation included petition signing, boycotting, rallies 
and demonstrations. In Great Britain, three dimensions of 
participation (conventional, mild unconventional and strong 
unconventional) have been found (Clarke et al., 2004).
Unconventional forms of political participation are more 
compatible with the postmaterialist values of younger gen-
erations, as they are more critical towards traditional chan-
nels in politics and parties, they prefer less hierarchical or-
ganizations and try to integrate their political action with 
their private sphere (Lichterman, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; 
Bennett, 1998; Wuthnow, 1998; Eliasoph, 1998; Norris, 
1999; Lowndes, 2000; Bang and Sørensen, 2001; Putnam, 
2002; Hustinx and Lammertyn, 2003; Hooghe et al., 2005; 
Hooghe and Dejaeghere, 2007; Marien et al., 2010).
Furthermore, Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) found con-
gruence between postmaterialist values and behavior, for 
example people on the traditional end of the postmaterial-
ist spectrum are less likely to recycle or join environmental-
ist groups, the opposite of people on the self-expresion end, 
while Opp (1990) found a strong correlation between post-
materialist values and the perceived efficacy of protests.
Since Barnes and Kaase (1979) first identified ideolog-
ical self-identification and postmaterialist values as pre-
dictors of protest behavior, both measurements of ideology 
have been extensively used in the literature for that pur-
pose. Research on the relationship between self-placement 
in the left-right continuum and protest has led to contradic-
tory results: while some papers find a correlation between 
self-identification with the left and protesting (for example, 
Muller, 1979; Muller and Godwin, 1984; Boulding, 2014), 
others found a U-shaped pattern where the extremes pro-
test more. The previously mentioned contradictory findings 
could be related to the already explained problems with 
self-identification, or the explanation might lie in country-
level differences (Opp et al., 1995).
Torcal et al. (2016) researched protests in several Euro-
pean countries, with findings that are consistent with the 
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previously mentioned literature: left-wingers were more 
prone to protest than right-wingers, except for right-wing 
extremists, giving credit to the U-shaped theory. However, 
the relationship between protester’s and Government’s ide-
ologies were unexpected: While left-wingers protest more 
under right-wing Governments, they were still more likely 
to protest under left-wing government than right-wingers. 
On the other side of the spectrum, right-wing extremists 
were more likely to protest under right-wing Governments. 
The findings about the postmaterialist dimension are 
clearer. Dissatisfaction and elite-challenging participation 
fits better with postmaterialist values (Inglehart and Welzel, 
2005), and indeed postmaterialist values and their equiva-
lents in Schwartz Theory of Basic Values have proven to be 
strong predictors for protest (Opp, 1990; Schwartz, 2006, 
Welzel and Deutsch, 2012). 
Finally, an interaction effect has been found between 
the ideological self-identification on the left (especially ex-
treme left) and the profile of being a person on the emanci-
patory end of the postmaterialist spectrum. More specifical-
ly, using Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Human Values, Torcal 
et al. (2016) find that extreme left-wingers that score low 
on the values security and conformity, and high on univer-
salism are significantly more likely to protest than extreme 
left-wingers that do not have those scores. The difference 
also exists for moderate left-wingers, although in that case 
the difference is not significant. 
This interaction effect is particularly important, as it is 
precisely the type of interaction of elements in a web of 
significance that a more detailed definition of ideology de-
mands: the proclivity to participate politically increases 
through the relationship between the elements, left-right 
self-identification and values, in this case. 
Hypothesis
The general hypothesis of the paper is that there is a re-
lationship between ideology (as defined in this paper and 
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measured through political values and attitudes) and un-
conventional political participation, for the Costa Rican case 
during the 2014 elections (HG). 
A specific hypothesis for the material dimension is that 
people closer to the statist pole will reflect class-interest in 
their value and attitudes, and following Marxist, socialdemo-
cratic or similar theories, would conceive the current State 
as responding to capitalists’ interests, therefore being more 
prone to engage in protest (H1).
If there is one consistent finding in ideology and protest 
literature, it is that individuals that see themselves as more 
left-wing are more likely to protest. Furthermore, solidarity is 
a highly valued leftist principle, also pushing people closer to 
that pole to participate in collective actions (Opp et al., 1995) 
On the other hand, there is no clear relationship between 
being closer to the liberal pole in the materialist scale and 
protest, or for that matter other forms of political behavior. 
In the postmaterialist dimension, people with more eman-
cipatory values would choose less institutionalized types of 
participation, in particular protest (H2), as it is elite-challeng-
ing, critical towards stablished political channels and non-hi-
erarchical. This would be in line with the findings of Inglehart 
and Oyserman (2004), Opp (1990) and Torcal et al. (2016). 
On the contrary, people closer to the collectivist pole 
would be interested foremost in keeping group cohesion, so 
they would avoid the confrontational protest and would prefer 
a more legal form of participation like administrative proce-
dures (H3). Values and attitudes are, after all, normative beliefs, 
and as such they do not only prescript how society should be-
have, but also how individuals should behave. Obtaining social 
change through means that endanger group cohesion would 
not be acceptable for people with collectivist values. 
III. The Costa Rican case
Costa Rica offers and interesting case of study for two rea-
sons: the age of its democracy and the emergence of post-
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materialist values in a sector of the population, which co-
exist with most of the population still espousing material 
values.
With regards to the first reason, Costa Rica has had un-
interrupted democratic rule since 1949. Because of this Nor-
ris (2002: 225) classified it as the only consolidated de-
mocracy in Latin America. Costa Rica is then a particularly 
valuable case to study new forms of participation because, 
while it presents characteristics commonly associated with 
old democracies like declining turnout and eroding party 
loyalties, it is not what one would call a Western country, 
and, as “much existing research on political participation 
is based upon the United States as well as on established 
Western European and Anglo-American democracies. Yet it 
is not clear how far we can generalize more widely from 
these particular countries” (Norris, 2002: 10). 
As for the emergence of postmaterialist values in Cos-
ta Rica, a case could be argued against this happening in 
an economically underdeveloped country. However, So-
jo (2010) clearly identifies social groups in the country that 
have the characteristics of groups with postmaterialist val-
ues. This, alongside the cultural influence of postmaterial-
ist societies through globalization, suggests the possibility 
of an emergence of postmaterialist political values and at-
titudes in certain sections of the population (Welzel, 2007: 
191, R. Inglehart, personal communication, Friday, February 
the 12th, 2016). 
Aside from the uniqueness of the Costa Rican case, the 
Cuarta Encuesta de Cultura Política y Comportamiento Elec-
toral itself presents a special opportunity to research ideol-
ogy in Costa Rica, as it contains a battery of questions on 
the topic more detailed than in any previous survey applied 
on the country, as well as several types of participation be-
yond turnout and campaign participation. 
This last point is particularly relevant for mass behavior 
literature, considering the observed increase in non-elec-
toral forms of participation all throughout the world (Marien 
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el al., 2010) as well as the lack of insight as to why an in-
dividual chooses one type of participation over another 
(Leighley, 1995).
As with many other countries in the world, in Costa Rica 
turnout has decreased in the last 20 years and the meaning 
of “politics” seems to have widened. Factor analysis applied 
to post-electoral surveys from 2007 and 2011 identified 
three types of political participation: “contact with politi-
cians”, “institutional report” (administrative procedures) 
and “social demonstration” (protest) (Ramírez, 2010; Alfaro 
et al., 2012). Of these, “contact with politicians” would be a 
conventional form of participation, while both “administra-
tive procedures” and “protest” would be categorized as un-
conventional. 
While “administrative procedures” is similar to “contact 
with politicians” in as much as in both cases an authority 
is contacted, a key difference lies in that the latter involves 
an elected official, mediating concepts like voter support 
and accountability. Administrative procedures are more of 
a judicial act: both the ombudsman and the constitutional 
magistrados are not popularly elected but rather chosen as 
technocrats, and their actions are intended to be more legal 
than political. In a sense, administrative procedures are a 
politization of the judiciary done by the citizenry. 
Factor analysis is a common technique for identifying 
types of participation and has the advantage that it might 
capture case-specific variations, for example Bratton (1999) 
used it for the Zambian case and found four factors: voting, 
contacting, communing and protesting, of which the third 
was a unique category for that country. 
While protest has a long history in Costa Rica, it has low 
legitimacy as it has been seen as an anti-establishment ac-
tivity, unseemly in a social-democratic country. That said, the 
efficacy of it has shown a steady growth (Alfaro et al., 2012). 
People engaged in unconventional types of participation had 
been identified to be less individualistic, less authoritarian, 
against CAFTA-DR and mostly workers (Alpízar, 2013: 5).
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There are currently two projects centered on measuring 
collective actions7 in Costa Rica. The first one is maintained 
by the Programa Estado de la Nación (PEN),8 which reg-
isters all collective actions reported in the three most im-
portant newspapers in the country. The other database is 
PROTESTAS, maintained by the Instituto de Investigaciones 
Sociales of the University of Costa Rica (IIS-UCR), which us-
es a similar methodology but with different newspapers 
(Alpízar, 2014; Alvarado Alcázar, 2016).
Figure 2.  
Total number of collective actions registered by the PEN  
and IIS-UCR databases per year, Costa Rica, 1992-2017
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Figure 2 shows the number of collective actions per year. 
Workers are by far the most active in this type of partici-
7 Collective actions are defined as: “Any event limited in the same space-ti-
me in which a collective or group of people participate to express a collective 
demand or grievance to a public or private entity” (Instituto de Investigacio-
nes Sociales-Universidad de Costa Rica and Programa Estado de la Nación, 
2015: 2). The database includes the following types of collective action: rally, 
march, blockade, strike, public declaration, complaint to State or international 
entities, meeting politicians, meetings, threat, violence against private pro-
perty, breaking into private property, hunger strike, organizing a law proposal 
through popular initiative.
8 For completeness sake I used December 2017 as a cut off point for the data 
presented in this paper. I also decided to include the IIS-UCR data even though 
it is a much shorter period to show that at least the patterns correspond bet-
ween both datasets. Fortunately, the IIS-UCR has data all the way back to the 
year 2000, and while at the moment they are in process of clean-up of the da-
taset, in the near future it should be possible to compare the two sets further. 
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pation, with 45% of all mobilizations being led by unions, 
which is in accordance to hypothesis H1. The engagement 
is also highly contextual: all the dramatic increases corres-
pond to highly conflictive years. 
The black line corresponds to the PEN database, the gray 
one to the IIS.
IV. Research design
The Cuarta Encuesta de Cultura Política y Comportamien-
to Electoral was a personal and home survey with national 
coverage. The sampling method was two-staged, stratified 
by planning region and then with random simple sampling 
without replacement. The questionnaire was created by the 
Centro de Investigación y Estudios Políticos of the University 
of Costa Rica, between December 8th and 19th, 2014, based 
on the one used on Abstencionistas en Costa Rica. ¿Quiénes 
son y por qué no votan? (Raventós et al., 2005).
It was answered by 1601 persons, who were legal Costa 
Rican citizens over 19 years old who could vote in the 2014 
election and had a place of residence. 968 of the partici-
pants were female, and the remaining 633 were male. The 
ages were between 19 and 91, with a standard deviation of 
16.61. 
Two batteries of the questionnaire were used: A - Politi-
cal culture and participation, questions A-10 to A-199; and 
9 The specific items that were used from module A are: “There are different forms 
to participate in politics. In your opinion, how effective do you believe it to be 
to solve a problem….?” This question is followed by: “In the last ten years, ha-
ve you…” If the answer is yes, the follow up is: “Would you do it again?” In ca-
se the answer is no, the follow up would be “Would you be willing to do it?”
A10.- Meeting with a politician
A11.- Helping in a politician’s campaign 
A12.- Signing a letter to a politician
A13.- Participating in a demonstration or a protest 
A14.- Blocking roads in a protest
A16.- Filing an appeal to the Constitutional Court
A17.- Making a complaint to the Ombudsman
A18.- Meeting with governmental authorities
A19.- Sharing opinions in social media sites like Facebook or Twitter
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E - Ideology, questions E-1 to E-15. In the first one the par-
ticipants answered whether they had taken part in certain 
types of political participation over the last ten years, and 
whether they would do it again.
A scale of political participation intensity is then cre-
ated to perform the factor analysis. This was done by as-
signing a value depending on the level of engagement with 
participation: 3 for those who had participated (whether 
they would do it again or not), 2 for those who had not but 
would, and 1 for those who had not and would not.
N/A’s were also categorized as 1, because it is assumed 
that a lack of response reflects either a lack of interest or 
knowledge about a form of participation. As the percentage 
of non-response is less than 3%, there is no danger of al-
tering the statistical results; however, it is necessary to do it 
as the factor analysis cannot be done with missing values.
In battery E, a series of statements was read to the par-
ticipants about potential roles the State could play to reg-
ulate society, and then they were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the statements.10
“A15.- Calling the media to complain” was not included in the analysis, as in 
preliminary trials it did not load in any factor and diminished the explained 
variance. This question does not refer to the relationship without the citizenry 
and the State, either.
10 The specific question was: “Next, I will read to you a series of statements about 
the function and competences of the State. Please tell me if you mostly agree 
or disagree with them:”
E1.- The State should increase jail sentences to improve citizen’s security
E2.- The State should regulate media and the Internet 
E3.- The State should keep Catholicism as the State religion
E4.- The State should legalize same-sex partnerships
E5.- The State should allow in-vitro fertilization
E6.- The State should allow the use and distribution of marihuana
E7.- The State should limit foreigners entering the country searching for work
E8.- The State should ensure free access to health-care and education
E9.- The State should be the main responsible in decreasing the gap between 
the rich and the poor
E10.- The State should guarantee that all workers can join a union
E11.- The State should limit companies that damage the environment 
E12.- The State should regulate private businesses
E13.- The State should own the main businesses and industries of the country
E14.- The State should limit foreign products entering the country to protect 
national producers
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To avoid collinearity problems, all the NA answers were 
replaced by 0.5, as it is one of the most common substi-
tution techniques.The questions in this section are divid-
ed into two groups: materialist (E8-E14) and postmaterial-
ist (E1-E7). Afterwards, the participants were asked to rate 
themselves in a 10-point left-right ideological scale.11
Considering that some of the questions between E1 and 
E14 represent a clearer ideological positioning, for each 
question, one is divided by the percentage of the popula-
tion that answered negatively. After this is done, the results 
for all the questions on the same scale are added and the 
results are standardized.
As mentioned before, there are two dominating models 
for explaining political participation, the SES Model and the 
Rational Choice model. Institutional and cultural explana-
tions, the latter of which includes values and attitudes, are 
also considered to explain participation. Variables that are 
considered significantly relevant for those models that are 
present in the Cuarta Encuesta are identified in Table A1.
A second canonical correlation will be performed (Mod-
el B), in which these variables will be included as controls. 
It is important to remember that this research does not put 
forward the idea that ideology will be the only, or even the 
most important predictor of political participation. Instead, 
what it sets out to prove is simply that it matters, that ide-
ology is relevant to explaining political participation in the 
case of a non-post-industrial, non-developed Western de-
mocracy with a section of the population with postmaterial-
ist values, like Costa Rica.
11 “15.- When talking about political tendencies, many people talk about those 
who sympathize more with the left or the right. According to what “left” and 
“right” mean to you when you think about your political viewpoint, where 
would you be in that scale?” 
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V. Analysis
Ideological scales
Figure A1 (see Appendix) showcases the percentage of af-
firmative answers for each question in battery E. With re-
gards to economic (material) matters, there is high sup-
port for government intervention to ensure access to basic 
needs like health and education, as well as protecting the 
environment and diminishing inequality. Support, how-
ever, decreases for purely economic matters, and it is low 
for state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, there is no 
clear trend for support in postmaterialist matters. 
Table 1 shows three groups for both the materialist and 
the postmaterialist scales, as well as for the self-identifica-
tion question. The first group would be the one with val-
ues below 4, the second group would have values between 
4 and 8 and the last group would be the one with values 
above 8. It’s interesting to note that only 2% of the popula-
tion can be identified as economic liberals whereas statists 
are a far bigger group (77.6%), which is in contradiction to 
the self-identification percentages.The postmaterialist dis-
tribution is more balanced between the center and collec-
tivists, although there is still in this case a clear preference 
for social control.
Table 1.  
Comparison between the materialist and postmaterialist scales 
and self-identification, Costa Rica, 2014
Group I 
more social control
Group II 
center
Group III 
more  
freedom
Materialist values scale Statism77.6% 20.4%
Economic  
Liberalism
2.0%
Postmaterialist values 
scale
Collectivism
46.2% 44.6%
Emancipation
9.2%
Ideological 
self-identification Left 7.3% 58.3%  Right 27.0%
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Exploratory factor analysis for political participation
The first function of the factor analysis explains 36% of the 
variance; the second one explains 16.7% and the third one, 
14.5%. Only this three are chosen as relevant as they are 
the only ones with eigen values greater than 1, which is 
the condition that was set. Together these functions ex-
plain 67% of the original variance. To know which ques-
tions load which factors, one must look in Table 2 for corre-
lations above 0.7.
Table 2. Rotated factor matrix, Costa Rica, 2014
Contact 
with politicians Protest
Administrative 
procedure
Meeting with a politician 0.83 0.09 0.13
Helping in a politician’s  
campaign 0.81 0.13 0.04
Signing a letter to a politician 0.72 0.14 0.21
Participate in a demonstration 
or a protest 0.15 0.86 0.09
Blocking roads in a protest 0.03 0.87 0.03
Filing an appeal to  
the Constitutional Court 0.19 0.13 0.85
Making a complaint to the 
Ombudsman 0.11 0.13 0.88
Sharing their opinions  
in social media 0.17 0.46 0.18
Extraction method: Principal axis factoring. Rotation method:  
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. The rotation converged in 5 iterations.12
Canonical correlation analysis
Canonical correlation analysis investigates the relationship 
between two sets of variables, by creating functions that 
maximize the said relationship. It is a more general case of 
multiple regression, but it also has multiple dependent va-
riables. Each of the functions in the CCA has an associated 
12 Question A18 (meeting with a Government representative) was eliminated in 
order to improve the goodness of fit. Question A15 (denouncing to the press) 
was not considered in the analysis as it was not a form of political participation.
REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 8 (1), 2019 145
vector (composed of structure coefficients) that works like 
the β coefficients in a regression and maximizes the rela-
tionship. In other words, the structure coefficients represent 
the highest possible existent correlation between the sets 
of variables.
For this paper, the predictors for the types of political 
participation will be the previously created scales for ma-
terialist (x1) and postmaterialist (x2) values, as well as the 
ideological self-identification (x3), as these three elements 
would be the elements of the ideological web of signifi-
cance. For clarity’s sake, if ideology is I and e represents 
all the other unknown elements in the web of significance 
while βi is an undetermined series of beta-weights, ideol-
ogy can be defined as I = β1 x1+β2 x2+β3 x3+e.
For their part, the dependent variables will be con-
tact with politicians (Y1), protest (Y2) and administra-
tive procedure (Y3).The analysis resulted in three func-
tions with squared canonical correlations (Rc²) of 0.03802, 
0.02634 and 0.00024. Collectively, the model is statistical-
ly significant using a Wilk’s l of 0.93642 F (9.00; 3538.80) 
=10.75759, p<0.001. 
As the Wilk’s l represents the variability not explained 
by the model, then 1-l=1-0.93642=0.06358 represents 
the explained variability. This indicates that the model is 
significant, but its explanatory capability is only of 6%. It is 
important to point out that the Canonical Correlation Analy-
sis considers R² values as low as 0.02 as significant (Alpert 
and Peterson, 1972).
Alongside that, the research question of this paper was 
concerned with the existence of a relationship between the 
two sets of variables, and it was never its intention to pre-
dict behavior. Taking those two facts into account, it is con-
sidered that the results are valuable enough to compare 
them with the hypothesis presented, although no predic-
tive implications can be drawn. Now, as function I has a 
Rc² of 0.03802 and II of 0.02634, the addition of these two 
numbers is almost identical to the total Rc² of the canonical 
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correlation analysis. For this reason, only the first two func-
tions are considered worthy of interpretation.
For the interpretation of Table 3, both the standardized 
canonical coefficients and the structure coefficients (rs) are 
important. The first, as previously explained, are equivalent 
to the β coefficients in regression. They indicate how im-
portant a variable is to create the maximum correlation be-
tween the two sets of variables. The structure coefficients 
indicate how important that variable is without any distor-
tion created by other variables. In both cases, coefficients 
above 0.4 are significant. The analysis then indicates that 
for function I, both ideological scales and all the types of 
participation were relevant, whereas for function II the rel-
evant variables were self-identification, contact with politi-
cians and protest. 
The canonical correlation analysis indicates that, as peo-
ple are more liberal in the materialist scale and more collec-
tivist in the post-materialist scale, they become less likely to 
engage in any unconventional type of participation. 
Aside from that, as people self-identify more with the 
right, they are more likely to contact politicians and less 
likely to protest. These findings fit with the specific hypoth-
eses related to protest, but not with the one about admin-
istrative procedure. The ideology of the few that partici-
pate in unconventional ways would then be composed of 
elements such as statist and emancipatory values and atti-
tudes as well as self-identification with the left. 
Table 3.  
Model A: Summary of the canonical correlation analysis,  
Costa Rica, 2014
Functions pair I Functions pair II Functions pair III
Standard 
coef. Rs rs² (%)
Stan-
dard co-
ef.
Rs rs² (%)
Standard 
coef. rs rs² (%)
h² 
(%)
Materialist
values -0.70 -0.66 43.25 0.34 0.32 10.33 0.64 0.68 46.43 100 
Postmate-
rialist  
values
0.75  0.72 51.26 0.08 0.26 6.99 0.69 0.65 41.75 100 
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Self-iden-
tification -0.03 -0.18 3.12 -0.93 -0.94 87.60 0.41 0.31 9.28 100 
Rc² 3.80 2.63 0.02
Contact 
with  
politicians
-0.52 -0.51 26.16 0.72 0.72 51.47 -0.46 -0.47 22.38 100 
Protest -0.65 -0.65 41.74 -0.68 -0.69 46.91 -0.34 -0.34 11.35 100 
Admin-
istrative 
procedure
-0.57 -0.56 31.26 0.13 0.12 1.43 0.81 0.82 67.31 100 
Before moving further with model B, a series of checks are 
performed between the control and independent variables, 
to ensure the lack of multicollinearity. Table A2 reports the 
Pearson correlation between metric variables, as well as 
the significance. Table A3 reports a chi-squared hypothesis 
test with an alpha of α = 0.05 for the categorical variables, 
reporting first Cramer’s V and then the significance. Finally, 
Table A4 reports the relationship between metric and cat-
egorical variables with two eta coefficients: one for when 
the categorical value is the independent one, and one for 
when the metrical one is. Due to the size of the sample 
(n=1601) all the cases will appear as significant. The litmus 
test here is to identify which are high enough to cause mul-
ticollinearity problems, that is, a Person correlation, Cramer’s 
V or eta coefficient above 0.7. This happens in none of the 
cases, therefore it is safe to assume that there are no multi-
collinearity issues with model B.
Model B is a Canonical Correlation Analysis includ-
ing the control variables. It produces three functions with 
squared canonical correlations (Rc²) of 0.26393, 0.07845 
and 0.01665. Collectively, the model is statistically sig-
nificant using a Wilk’s l of 0.66703 F (48.00; 4286.69) 
=13.02473, p<0.001. The variability explained by the mod-
el is of 1-l=1-0.66703=0.33297. Model B has then an ex-
planatory capability of 33.30%. Once again, only the two 
first functions are worthy of interpretation. 
In Table 4, function I indicates that education, being a 
member of voluntary associations, having an interest in 
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politics and democratic civic values all make it more likely 
for someone to engage in any of the three forms of partici-
pation, which is completely expected. Function II indicates 
that self-identification with the right, being older and hav-
ing more democratic civic values all make it more likely for 
someone to contact a politician, and the relationship is in-
verse for protesting.
As can be seen, the materialist and postmaterialist 
scales are not significant in model B. Does this mean that 
they were some sort of intermediate variable between 
something else and participation? This seems unlikely, at 
least for the controls used, as the Pearson’s correlation, chi-
square and eta tests indicate that there was no multicol-
linearity. 
What is more likely is that the much more powerful ex-
planatory variables in the model are “crowding them out”. 
The CCA has a limit to the amount of equations it creates 
to maximize correlation between the dependent and inde-
pendent variables. Once it has been reached, the systems 
simply cannot correlate more, which can be seen in Table 4 
in the h² coefficients, which are much lower than in model 
A. Simply put, adding more variables makes the maximum 
amount of correlation possible lower. 
Table 4.  
Model B: Summary of the canonical correlation analysis  
with controls, Costa Rica, 2014
Functions pair I Functions pair II Functions pair III
Standard 
coef. Rs
rs² 
(%)
Standard 
coef. Rs rs² (%)
Standard 
coef. rs
rs² 
(%) h² (%)
Materialist 
scale -0.19 -0.26 6.76 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.35 -0.28 7.84 14.61
Postma-
terialist 
scale
0.13  0.22 4.84 0.09 0.33 10.89 0.15 0.14 1.96 17.69
Self-iden-
tification -0.03 0.05 0.25 -0.34 -0.55 30.25 -0.04 -0.08 0.64 31.14
Gender -0.12 -0.13 1.69 0.06 0.05 0.25 0.61 0.39 15.21 17.15
Age 0.05 0.11 1.21 0.55 0.68 46.24 -0.16 -0.01 0.01 47.46
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Elementa-
ry school  
dummy
0.39 0.37 13.69 0.24 -0.39 15.21 0.04 -0.04 0.16 29.06
High 
school 
dummy
0.24 -0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.19 3.61 0.47 0.37 13.69 17.34
University 
dummy 0 -0.43 18.49 0 -0.29 8.41 0 -0.30 9 35.9
Unem-
ployed 
dummy
-0.18 0.12 1.44 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 -0.44 0.02 0.04 1.57
Public  
sector 
dummy
-0.20 -0.29 8.41 -0.30 -0.16 2.56 -0.37 -0.01 0.01 10.98
Private 
sector 
dummy
-0.09 0.13 1.69 -0.07 -0.03 0.09 -0.73 -0.11 1.21 2.99
Owner 
dummy -0.26 -0.11 1.21 -0.05 0.13 1.69 -0.59 0.03 0.09 2.99
Unknown 
sector 
dummy
0 0.14 1.96 0 0.18 3.24 0 0.17 2.89 8.09
Income 0.09 -0.10 1 0.18 0.02 0.04 -0.37 -0.30 9 10.04
Party  
loyalty -0.03 -0.15 2.25 0.11 0.30 9 0.51 0.50 25 36.25
Voluntary 
associa-
tion
-0.46 -0.62 38.44 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.14 1.96 40.41
Interest in 
politics -0.25 -0.53 28.09 -0.26 -0.06 0.36 0.07 0.14 1.96 30.41
Civic  
values -0.44 -0.68 46.24 0.52 0.45 20.25 -0.19 -0.10 1 67.49
Rc² 26.39 7.85 1.67
Contact 
with  
politicians
-0.83 -0.82 67.24 0.45 0.45 20.25 0.34 0.35 12.25 99.74
Protest -0.40 -0.40 16 -0.89 -0.89 79.21 0.21 0.20 4 99.21
Adminis-
trative  
procedure
-0.41 -0.40 16 -0.03 -0.04 0.16 -0.91 -0.92 84.64 100
VI. Results
The factors obtained in the exploratory factor analysis are 
the same ones identified in the two previous elections, 
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which indicates that they are stable in time. The percen-
tage of participation for each factor is 22.6%, 12.1% and 
6.8%, which showcases that all the unconventional forms 
have low participation. It is worth noting that protest had 
more participation than administrative procedure.
The ideological scales indicate that most Costa Ricans 
are both heavily in favor of State intervention in the econ-
omy and of collectivist attitudes that strengthen social co-
hesion, yet they self-identify more with the center and the 
right. Due to the ideological characteristic of the Costa Ri-
can population, the specific hypothesis would point to ad-
ministrative procedure being high, whereas protest would 
present a contradiction, as the tendency to engage in it 
would increase with statism but decrease with collectivism. 
However, non-electoral political participation is in fact low 
in Costa Rica.
The canonical correlation analysis performed indicated 
that more liberal people in the materialist scale and more 
collectivist people in the post-material scale are less likely 
to participate in all the unconventional repertoires of politi-
cal participation. This is the same to say that people with 
more statist and emancipatory variables are more likely to 
engage in unconventional participation, which is what sub-
hypothesis H1and H2 suggest. 
The results with regards to H3 (collectivists are more 
likely to engage in administrative procedure) are inconclu-
sive. Function I of model A indicates the inverse relation-
ship than the hypothesis, however function III supports the 
hypothesis. This could mean that once the maximum cor-
relation between all forms of participation has been ex-
plained by function I, then collectivists do indeed prefer ad-
ministrative procedures. However, as function III adds so 
little to the explanatory power of the model A, it is better to 
avoid any interpretation. 
Finally, some other findings are that those that self-
identify with the right more are more likely to contact poli-
ticians and less likely to protest, and those who participate 
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the most in unconventional ways are identified as being 
statist in economic matters, emancipatory in social matters 
and self-identifying with the left.
It should be noted that the canonical correlation analy-
sis identifies both the scales and self-identification as in-
fluential on the decision to participate, although the values 
and attitudes offer a more complete explanation. It is also 
important that both the dominant ideology and the ideol-
ogy of those that participate in unconventional ways are 
statist. 
VII. Conclusion
This paper set out to investigate the relationship between 
political values and attitudes, interpellated and organized 
by ideologies, and unconventional political participation in 
Costa Rica during the 2014 elections. The general hypothe-
sis HG (values and attitudes will influence unconventional 
participation) is confirmed. 
Sub-hypothesis H1 (being closer to the statist pole in 
the materialist scale will make people more likely to pro-
test) and H2 (being closer to the emancipatory pole in the 
postmaterialist scale will make people more likely to pro-
test) cannot be confirmed, even if the results of model A in-
dicate the same direction as the hypothesis. 
H3 (being closer to the collectivist pole in the postmate-
rialist scale will make people more likely to engage in ad-
ministrative procedures) is rejected because no clear rela-
tionship emerges between the variables. 
Factor Analysis confirms the types of participation found 
in previous studies (Ramírez, 2010; Alfaro et al., 2012): con-
tact with politicians, protest and administrative procedures. 
Most Costa Ricans have values and attitudes that support 
State intervention in the economy and strengthen social 
cohesion, yet they identify with the center and the right. 
Unconventional political participation is low, and most 
common amongst people that are statist on the material di-
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mension, emancipatory on the postmaterialist one and self-
identify as leftists. 
The fact that self-identification, materialist and postma-
terialist values together make people more likely to partici-
pate in unconventional fashion, points in the same direc-
tion as the findings of interactive effects between values 
and self-identification in Torcal et al. (2016): ideology as a 
web with interactions is what drives the participation, not 
just one of the individual elements. 
Having said this, values and attitudes have a great-
er explanatory power than ideological self-identification. 
In model A, function I is mostly concerned with values and 
has a Rc² of 0.03802, whereas function II is mostly relat-
ed with self-identification and has a Rc²of 0.02634. This 
means that, in model A, values and attitudes account for 
3% of the changes in all the forms of participation, whereas 
self-identification accounts for 2%. 
The lack of consistency between ideological self-iden-
tification in a left-right scale and the material and post-
materialist scales is a fundamental finding of this work. Be 
it because of lack of political sophistication, because it is 
tapping into a different dimension or simply because, as 
Converse considered, people have no clear political doc-
trine, the fact remains that when presented with specific 
economic policy, Costa Ricans favored statism, when pre-
sented with social policy they favored collectivism, and yet 
they still identified as center-right. This finding would have 
gone unnoticed if this paper did not pursue a more nuanced 
measurement of ideology by: i) measuring actual attitudes 
towards policy instead of just self-identification and, ii) 
measuring in more than one dimension. 
Previous studies on the effects of ideology in general, 
and in Latin America in particular, declare that leftists pro-
test more by merely looking at the self-identification. Just 
as the Costa Rican case is grossly mis-identified ideologi-
cally if we go only by self-identification, that could also be 
the case in many other studies, perhaps explaining the con-
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tradictory findings as to whether protest potential increases 
as people move to the left or to the extremes. 
If nothing else, this paper should show that if we are in-
terested in the aggregate direction of the policy preferences 
that citizens hold with regards to how resources are used in 
a society, ideology must be understood as a web of signifi-
cance and heuristics and not just self-identification.  
Recalling the illustrative equation for ideology, I = β1 
x1+β2 x2+β3 x3+e, if a type of participation is a function of 
ideology (amongst many other elements), the beta weights 
of values and self-identification can help us to potential-
ly identify the structure and relationship between the ele-
ments in the web of significance. The findings of this paper, 
in fact, suggest that, as values have more explanatory pow-
er than self-identification, then β1>β3 and β2>β3.
Cautious and well-crafted models would have to be built 
for this: as other studies have shown, there is an interac-
tive effect between postmaterialist values and self-identifi-
cation when predicting for protest. The explicit form of the 
function for protest could be more complex, due to this rela-
tionship between the x’s. 
Something noticeable in the analysis of this study is that 
every form of political participation displayed a different 
relationship with the explanatory variables. This suggests 
that further studies would benefit from considering each 
form of unconventional political participation as unique, 
with different explanatory variables. Therefore, these forms 
of political participation should not be studied as just one 
group, as they commonly are: there’s a plethora of papers 
that consider actions as signing a petition, boycotting prod-
ucts or recycling as fundamentally the same as taking part 
in a demonstration. 
Perhaps the most interesting findings regarding the ty-
pology of participation is the administrative procedure type. 
Little has been written about citizen’s use of judicial chan-
nels to support and hinder legislation and policy. Consid-
ering how fundamental the politization of the judiciary by 
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elites has become in Latin America, for example to length-
en presidential term limits, it becomes of substantial impor-
tance to explore the equivalent mechanisms available to 
the citizenry, especially as it was the one type of participa-
tion with contradictory findings in model A. 
An important challenge that the investigation faced was 
that the questionnaire was created with a very different 
topic in mind, and as such the importance that it gave to 
questions regarding ideology and unconventional partici-
pation was limited. Because of this, any possible statistical 
approach was ultimately doomed to yield a very low good-
ness of fit. Further studies into these topics in Costa Rica 
would benefit from drawing inspiration from questionnaires 
more clearly focused on values and attitudes, like the World 
Values Survey. 
It is important, however, to mention that the battery used 
in this investigation was a valiant first effort to measure ide-
ology in a more detailed manner that it had ever been pre-
viously done in Costa Rica. No other study was found that 
tried to do so beyond self-identification, the problems of 
which have already been discussed at length.
Even Lapop only includes four questions that could be 
considered related to ideology: self-identification, ques-
tions on whether the State should own the main industries 
of the country, if it should implement policy to decrease in-
equality and one whether democracy is superior to other 
governmental regimes. All those questions have equiva-
lents in the Cuarta Encuesta.
Finally, a question arises on whether the particularities 
noticed in this case (lack of ideological consistency in the pop-
ulation, characteristics of those who engage in political par-
ticipation) are exclusively Costa Rican or if they can be found 
in other Latin-American countries as well, or in other regions. 
Comparative studies (using, of course, similar questionnaires) 
would shed a light on this, and so could Sartori’s categoriza-
tion of belief systems, particularly with regards to the internal 
consistency and the emotional dimension of the system.
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Appendix
Figure A1.  
Percentage of affirmative answers in favor of State intervention 
to the questions in battery E, Costa Rica, 2014
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Table A1.  
Control variables for model B
Variable Question (when given)
Included in model B as the fol-
lowing dummies (when the 
variable is categorical)
Gender 
Age
Educational 
level
“What was the last year of studies you 
have completed?” 
Elementary high school, high 
school, university.
Occupation “In your work, you are:”
Unemployed, public sector em-
ployee, private sector employ-
ee, owner, unknown sector
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Income
“Would you say that the total salary or in-
come that your family receives monthly is 
enough or not enough to survive?” This is 
a four-point continuous scale, the possible 
answers are:
0 - NA
1 - Not enough, we have great difficulties
2 - Not enough, we have difficulties
3 - It is barely enough, without great dif-
ficulties
4 - It is enough, we can save
Party loyalty
“Have you always supported that party?” 
This is a yes-no questions, a previous one 
asked if the respondent currently support-
ed a party.
Voluntary 
association
Questions A21 to A28 ask if the respondent 
has participated in a voluntary association 
in the last 5 years. Based on these ques-
tions, a voluntary association variable was 
created. Voluntary associations asked 
about: Local associations, unions, profes-
sional associations, political parties, PTAs, 
religious groups, solidarista13 association, 
groups in favor of human rights and envi-
ronmental protection.
Interest in 
politics
“Using the card again, where 5 means a 
lot and 1 means nothing, how much would 
you say that you are interested in politics?” 
Civic values
Questions A1 through A8 are used to cre-
ate a simple sum scale. Each of these ques-
tions was answered through a five-points 
scale. NAs were recorded as 0, since there 
are very few of them and they show a lack 
of interest in civic participation. The ques-
tions used are: “How important it is for you 
to:
A1 - Actively participate in voluntary orga-
nizations
A2 - Keep informed on what the Govern-
ment does
A3 - Voluntarily collaborate on electoral 
processes
A4 - Always obey the law
A5 - Actively participate in politics
A6 - Vote in elections
A7 - Respect people that think differently
A8 - Pay taxes
13 Solidarista associations are a form of unions in Costa Rica and other countries 
that encourage both workers and business owners to take part in them. The 
underlying logic is that of class collaboration instead of class conflict. 
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Table A2.  
Pearson’s correlations matrix and significance values  
for metric variables
Materialist 
values
Postmate
rialist values
Self- 
Identification Age Income
Civic 
values
Interest 
in  
politics
Materialist 
values
1
-
Postmaterial-
ist values
0,16
0,000
1
-
Self- 
Identification
0,00
0,896
-0,18
0,000
1
-
Age -0,010,663
0,23
0,000
-0,21
0,000
1
-
Income -0,120,000
-0,14
0,000
0,02
0,551
-0,09
0,000
1
-
Civic values 0,130,000
0,02
0,435
-0,17
0,000
0,00
0,883
0,06
0,021
1
-
Interest in 
politics
0,05
0,034
-0,02
0,552
-0,127
0,000
-0,05
0,066
-0,02
0,405
0,39
0,000
1
-
Table A3.  
Chi-square test for categorical variables 
Gender Educational level Ocupation Party loyalty
Voluntary 
association
Gender -
Education
al level
0,03
0,458 -
Ocupation 0,490,000
0,24
0,000 -
Party loyalty 0,010,586
0,08
0,012
0,07
0,132 -
Voluntary 
association
0,02
0,547
0,10
0,000
0,11
0,001
0,07
0,007 -
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Table A4.  
Eta coefficient test for categorical and metric variables
Gender Educational level Ocupation Party loyalty
Voluntary 
association
Materialist 
values
0,14
0,05
0,15
0,07
0,13
0,13
0,12
0,07
0,07
0,01
Postmateri
alist values
0,16
0,12
0,29
0,26
0,09
0,15
0,11
0,09
0,10
0,00
Self- 
identification
0,01
0,06
0,10
1,14
0,07
0,05
0,13
0,16
0,02
0,05
Age 0,220,06
0,31
0,26
0,28
030
0,25
0,15
0,24
0,00
Income 0,140,13
0,35
0,33
0,08
0,20
0,07
0,06
0,07
0,05
Civic values 0,140,04
0,17
0,09
0,14
0,11
0,21
0,16
0,22
0,19
Interest in 
politics
0,04
0,03
0,09
0,07
0,06
0,07
0,13
0,13
0,14
0,13
